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Abstract. The dream solution of the continuum hypothesis (CH) would be
a solution by which we settle the continuum hypothesis on the basis of a
newly discovered fundamental principle of set theory, a missing axiom, widely
regarded as true. Such a dream solution would indeed be a solution, since we
would all accept the new axiom along with its consequences. In this article,
however, I argue that such a dream solution to CH is unattainable.
Many set theorists yearn for a definitive solution of the continuum problem, what
I call a dream solution, one by which we settle the continuum hypothesis (CH) on
the basis of a new fundamental principle of set theory, a missing axiom, widely
regarded as true, which determines the truth value of CH. In [Hama], I describe
the dream solution template as proceeding in two steps: first, one introduces the
new set-theoretic principle, considered obviously true for sets in the same way that
many mathematicians find the axiom of choice or the axiom of replacement to be
true; and second, one proves the CH or its negation from this new axiom and
the other axioms of set theory. Such a situation would resemble Zermelo’s proof
of the ponderous well-order principle on the basis of the comparatively natural
axiom of choice and the other Zermelo axioms. If achieved, a dream solution to the
continuum problem would be remarkable, a cause for celebration.
In this article, however, I shall argue that a dream solution of CH has become
impossible to achieve. Specifically, what I claim is that our extensive experience
in the set-theoretic worlds in which CH is true and others in which CH is false
prevents us from looking upon any statement settling CH as being obviously true.
We simply have had too much experience by now with the contrary situation. Even
if set theorists initially find a proposed new principle to be a natural, obvious truth,
nevertheless once it is learned that the principle settles CH, then this preliminary
judgement will evaporate in the face of deep experience with the contrary, and
set-theorists will look upon the statement merely as an intriguing generalization or
curious formulation of CH or ¬CH, rather than as a new fundamental truth. In
short, success in the second step of the dream solution will inevitably undermine
success in the first step.
The continuum hypothesis, the assertion that every set of reals is either countable
or equinumerous with the whole of R, is equivalently formulated in ZFC as the
claim that the powerset P (N) of the natural numbers has the same cardinality as
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ω1, the first uncountable ordinal. Thus, the continuum hypothesis is the assertion
that the two classical means of constructing uncountable sets give rise to the same
uncountable cardinality. The question was open since the time of Cantor, appearing
at the top of Hilbert’s famous 1900 list of open questions, until Go¨del proved that
ZFC + CH holds in the constructible universe L of any model of ZFC, and Cohen
proved that L has a forcing extension L[G] satisfying ZFC + ¬CH. Going beyond
this connection to the constructible universe, both the continuum hypothesis and
its negation are forceable over any model of set theory:
Theorem 1 (Cohen, Solovay). The set-theoretic universe V has forcing extensions
(1) V [G], collapsing no cardinals, such that V [G] |= ¬CH, and
(2) V [H ], adding no new reals, such that V [H ] |= CH.
Although it was formerly common to undertake forcing constructions only for
countable transitive models of fragments of ZFC, one may formalize the forcing
method as an internal ZFC construction, rather than a meta-theoretic construction,
and thereby make sense of forcing over an arbitrary model of set theory, including
the over the full universe V . By means of what I have called the naturalist account
of forcing [Hama], or by the classical Boolean ultrapower (Boolean-valued quotient)
approach (e.g. see [HS, FHR]), one may legitimize the forcing-over-the-universe ap-
proach to forcing, by now the most common approach in the set-theoretic literature,
and it is this approach that resonates most strongly with the multiverse perspective
that the forcing extensions of V are real.
The theorem shows that every model of set theory is very close to models with the
opposite answer to CH. Since the CH and ¬CH are easily forceable, the continuum
hypothesis is something like a lightswitch, which can be turned on and off by moving
to ever larger forcing extensions. Indeed, a key concept in the modal logic of forcing
[HL08] is that of a switch, a statement ψ of set theory such that both ψ and ¬ψ
are forceable over any forcing extension of the universe. Thus, the continuum
hypothesis is a switch, one which set theorists today have truly flicked many times.
In each case of the theorem the forcing is relatively mild, with the new universes,
for example, having all the same large cardinals as the original universe, a fact that
refuted Go¨del’s hope that large cardinals might settle the CH. After decades of
experience and study, set-theorists today have a profound understanding of how to
achieve the continuum hypothesis or its negation in diverse models of set theory—
forcing it or its negation in innumerable ways, while simultaneously controlling
other set-theoretic properties—and have therefore come to a deep knowledge of the
extent of the continuum hypothesis and its negation in set-theoretic worlds.
More generally, I have argued in [Hama] that in set theory we have come to
discover an entire multiverse of set concepts, each giving rise to a corresponding
set-theoretic universe. Many of these set-theoretic universes are the universes that
we have long known and described in set theory, such as L, HOD, L[µ], K, HOD[A],
Vκ, Hκ+ , L(R), L(Vλ+1) and innumerably many others, including especially the
forcing extensions of these and other models by any of the enormous collection
of forcing notions that have been studied in set theory. In the past half-century,
set theorists have gained a precise familiarity with the nature of these diverse set-
theoretic worlds; we move from one to another with ease. Part of my goal in
the multiverse article was to tease apart two often-blurred aspects of set-theoretic
Platonism, namely, to separate the claim that the set-theoretic universe has a real
mathematical existence from the claim that it is unique. The multiverse perspective
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is meant to affirm the realist position, while denying the uniqueness of our set-
theoretic background concept. What we have learned in set theory is that we
have a choice of diverse set-theoretic universes, each arising from its own iterated
set concept. We may regard each of these universes to be fully as real as the
universists take their background set concept to be, just as one may regard all the
shades of blue as actual colors, regardless of any debate about which of them is to
be deemed officially “blue”. Our mathematical experience is that these alternative
set-theoretic worlds are perfectly fine set-theoretically; there is absolutely nothing
wrong with them, and we have gained an extensive experience living in them.
On the multiverse view the continuum hypothesis is a settled question, for the
answer consists of the expansive, detailed knowledge set theorists have gained about
the extent to which the CH holds and fails in the multiverse, about how to achieve
it or its negation in combination with other diverse set-theoretic properties. Of
course, there are and will always remain questions about whether one can achieve
CH or its negation with this or that hypothesis, but the point is that the most
important and essential facts about CH are deeply understood, and it is these facts
that constitute the answer to the CH question.
One way to understand my argument that we will not achieve the dream solution
of the continuum problem is to phrase it in terms of Quine’s web of belief [Qui51],
the view that our system of beliefs, even our scientific beliefs, forms a coherent
interconnected web for which in principle any part could be altered in the light
of new knowledge, but also for which new evidence needn’t force the revision of
any particular given part. My argument is that our extensive experience in all the
various set-theoretic universes with CH and with ¬CH, especially those obtained
by forcing, have pushed the dual possibilities of CH and ¬CH to the center of
our set-theoretic beliefs. Specifically, the idea that in any set-theoretic context,
there is a nearby and perfectly legitimate set-theoretic universe where CH has a
prescribed value has become a core set-theoretic intuition at the center of our beliefs
about CH in set theory, and set theorists would tenaciously hold onto it come what
may. Any newly proposed set-theoretic principle settling CH, if regarded as a new
fundamental truth, therefore, could not consistently be incorporated into the web
of belief without overturning these central commitments, but if regarded merely
as an intriguing formulation or strengthening of CH or ¬CH, in contrast, could be
incorporated into the web of belief with ease.
To support this claim further, let me borrow from the opposition. In his excellent
recent article, Daniel Isaacson [Isa08] mounts a vigorous appeal to second-order
categoricity arguments in order to establish the uniqueness of the set-theoretic
universe and thereby establish the cumulative hierarchy as what he calls a particular
mathematical structure. This style of argument goes back to Zermelo’s categoricity
argument characterizing the models of second-order set theory as precisely those
of the form Vκ for an inaccessible cardinal κ, but Isaacson proceeds further to
provide a characterization of the entire set-theoretic universe in terms of second-
order set-theoretic properties. Isaacson’s argument shares important features with
Martin’s similar argument of [Mar01], and both Isaacson and Martin eventually
use the categoricity arguments in order to defend the view that the continuum
hypothesis is a definite mathematical question (though neither says which way the
answer goes). Thus, Isaacson is aligned with the universist position. Nevertheless,
let us look more closely at his description of how particular mathematical structures
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become established, of how we come to know them, to support my argument against
the universe view.
Specifically, Isaacson distinguishes between the particular as opposed to general
mathematical structures, discussing the distinction at length in its connection to
structuralism. The structures of the natural numbers, the integers and the real
numbers are each particular mathematical structures, as opposed to the class of
all groups, all rings or all topological spaces, which are examples of classes of gen-
eral mathematical structures. Although both particular and general mathematical
structures are treated by means of mathematical axioms, the nature of this treat-
ment is fundamentally different in the two cases. Namely, with the particular
structures, we identify general principles true of these structures, which encapsu-
late our knowledge about them, characterize them up to isomorphism, and serve as
axioms in the sense that we use those general principles to unify diverse arguments
about the structures. With general mathematical structures, in contrast, such as
when we specify the class of rings by the ring axioms, the axioms have the character
of definitions or demarcations of the domain of discourse rather than self-evident
truths or encapsulations of specific knowledge.
Isaacson explains that our knowledge of particular mathematical structures arises
from our informal mathematical practice and experience with them.
“If the mathematical community at some stage in the development
of mathematics has succeeded in becoming (informally) clear about
a particular mathematical structure, this clarity can be made math-
ematically exact. Of course by the general theorems that establish
first-order languages as incapable of characterizing infinite struc-
tures the mathematical specification of the structure about which
we are clear will be in a higher-order language, usually by means of
a full second-order language. Why must there be such a character-
isation? Answer: if the clarity is genuine, there must be a way to
articulate it precisely. If there is no such way, the seeming clarity
must be illusory. Such a claim is of the character as the Church-
Turing thesis, for every apparently algorithmic process, there is a
Turing machine or λ-calculus formal computation. In the present
case, for every particular structure developed in the practice of
mathematics, there is [a] categorical characterization of it.”(p. 31,
December 20, 2007 version)
He specifically identifies a notion of informal rigour by which we come to understand
the particular mathematical structures.
“The something more that is needed to represent true sentence of
arithmetic as logical consequences of the second-order axioms of
arithmetic is. . . the informal rigour by which we have come to un-
derstand these second-order axioms, and thereby to see that they
are coherent. It is a development of mathematical understanding
through informal rigour and not some further derivation that is
needed.. . .We must reflect on our conceptual understanding of a
given particular mathematical structure as it has developed to see
how it is that truths of e.g. arithmetic are those that hold in the
structure of the natural numbers which we have succeeded in char-
acterizing.” (p. 33, December 20, 2007 version)
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I claim that it is precisely this kind of mathematical experience that set-theorists
have gained with respect to the various (particular) forcing extensions of the uni-
verse and the other models of set theory commonly studied. We know what it is like
to live in the universe obtained by adding ℵ2 many Cohen reals over L and what it is
like in the L(R) of that extension. We know what it is like in the universe obtained
by forcing MA + ¬CH over L, or by forcing with Sacks forcing, or by iteratively
adding a dominating real. The resulting universes are places we’ve been. We are
deeply familiar with the universe obtained by forcing with the Laver preparation
of a supercompact cardinal and with the model of PFA obtained by Baumgartner’s
similar construction. This is not to say that we know everything that there is to
know about these universes—there will always be more to learn about them—just
as Isaacson mentions that we do not know the complete theory of arithmetic even
though we seem to have the integers as a particular mathematical structure. But
we have sufficient experience living in these diverse set-theoretic worlds to know
that the concept of set used in each of them is perfectly robust and satisfactory
as a concept of set. Each of these universes feels fully set-theoretic, and one can
imagine living out a full mathematical life inside almost any one of them.
It is for this reason that the dream solution has become impossible. Our situation
with CH is not merely that CH is formally independent and we have no additional
knowledge about whether it is true or not. Rather, we have an informed, deep
understanding of how it could be that CH is true and how it could be that CH fails.
We know how to build the CH and ¬CH worlds from one another. Set theorists
today grew up in these worlds, comparing them and moving from one to another
while controlling other subtle features about them. Consequently, if someone were
to present a new set-theoretic principle Φ and prove that it implies ¬CH, say, then
we could no longer look upon Φ as obviously true. To do so would negate our
experience in the CH worlds, which we found to be perfectly set-theoretic. It would
be like someone proposing a principle implying that only Brooklyn really exists,
whereas we already know about Manhattan and the other boroughs. And similarly
if Φ were to imply CH. We are simply too familiar with universes exhibiting both
sides of CH for us ever to accept as obviously true a principle that is false in some
of them. So success in the second step of the dream solution fatally undermines
success in the first step.
In summary, for any particular attempt at a dream solution of the continuum
problem, where a new set-theoretic principle is proposed and proved to settle CH,
then I predict that set theorists will object to the claim that the principle is ob-
viously true, and furthermore, their objections will arise from a wellspring of deep
mathematical experience with the contrary hypothesis.
Let me illustrate with examples of how this predicted pattern of response has
in fact already occurred a few times. Consider first the reaction to Chris Freiling’s
delightful axiom of symmetry [Fre86]. Freiling describes his argument as containing
“a simple philosophical ‘proof’ of the negation of Cantor’s continuum hypothesis”
and presents a line of reasoning that I find exactly to follow the dream solution tem-
plate. Namely, Freiling begins with a bit of philosophical intuition-building, “sub-
ject[ing] the continuum to certain thought experiments involving random darts,”
before ultimately landing at his axiom of symmetry, presented as a true and natural
axiom, an “intuitively clear axiom,” whose truth, Freiling argues, follows from our
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strongest pre-reflective ideas about symmetry and likelihood, the same intuitions
that underlie the fundamental concepts of measure theory.
Let us jump into the details, which are fun to consider. The axiom of symmetry
is the assertion that for any function f mapping reals to countable sets of reals,
there are real numbers x and y such that y /∈ f(x) and x /∈ f(y). To argue for the
natural appeal of the axiom, Freiling proposes that we imagine throwing two darts
in succession at a dart board, considering precisely where they land. The first dart
lands at some position x, and because f(x) is a countable set, we expect almost
surely that the second dart will land at a point y not in that set, and so almost
surely y /∈ f(x). But since the order in which we consider the darts shouldn’t
seem to matter, we conclude by symmetry that almost surely x /∈ f(y) as well.
So almost surely our darts will land at positions x and y fulfilling the axiom of
symmetry claim y /∈ f(x) and x /∈ f(y). Freiling emphasizes that not only do we
have natural reason to expect that there is a pair (x, y) with the desired property,
but what is more, we should expect that almost all pairs have the desired property:
“actually [the axiom], being weaker than our intuition, does not say that the two
darts have to do anything. All it claims is that what heuristically will happen every
time, can happen.” Thus, Freiling argues for the natural appeal and truth of the
axiom of symmetry.
Many mathematicians, in my personal experience, though usually not the more
experienced mathematicians, find this dart-throwing thought experiment quite ap-
pealing upon the first presentation, at least at this point in the argument, and
regard it as providing a natural support for the axiom of symmetry. These math-
ematicians are often quite surprised, in the second part of Freiling’s argument, to
learn that the axiom of symmetry is actually equivalent to ¬CH, and they uni-
versally revise their initial judgement of the axiom as a result. Nevertheless, the
equivalence of AS with ¬CH is not difficult to establish. The forward implication
is easy, for if CH holds, then there is a well-ordering of R in order type ω1, and
we may consider the function f mapping every real x to the initial segment of the
order up to x, a countable set. The point is that for any two real numbers, either
x precedes y or conversely in the well-order, and so either x ∈ f(y) or y ∈ f(x),
contrary to the axiom of symmetry. So AS =⇒ ¬CH, and this is already enough
for the intended dream solution. Conversely, if CH fails, then for any choice of ω1
many distinct reals xα, for α < ω1, the union
⋃
α<ω1
f(xα) has size ω1 and so by
¬CH there must be a real y not in any f(xα). Since f(y) contains at most countably
many xα, there must be some xα with xα /∈ f(y) and since we’ve already ensured
y /∈ f(xα), we have the desired pair (and in fact many such pairs). In summary,
the axiom of symmetry is equivalent to ¬CH, and Freiling has exactly carried out
the dream solution template for CH.
Was Freiling’s argument received as the longed-for solution to CH? No. Many
mathematicians objected that Freiling’s argument implicitly assumes for a given
function f that various sets are measurable, including most importantly the set
{ (x, y) | y ∈ f(x) } in the plane. Although each vertical slice of this set is count-
able and hence measure zero, Freiling’s argument relies on our intuitions concerning
two independent events—the two dart throws—and depends fundamentally on the
robustness of our measure concepts for this two-dimensional set. Freiling anticipates
this objection, answering that the intuitive justification he offers for the axiom of
symmetry can be viewed as prior to the mathematical development of measure
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theory. Our confidence in the axiom of symmetry itself, he argues, rests on the
same philosophical or pre-reflective ideas that underlie the technical mathematical
requirements we impose on our measure theory in the first place, such as our insis-
tence that measures be countably additive, and we would therefore seem to have as
much direct support for the axiom of symmetry as we have for those requirements.
My main point here is to observe the nature of the criticism, rather than to
debate the merits of the reply. Specifically, I want to call attention to the fact
that mathematicians objected to Freiling’s argument largely from a perspective of
deep experience and familiarity with non-measurable sets and functions, including
extreme violations of the Fubini property of the kind on which his argument relies.
For mathematicians with this experience and familiarity, the pre-reflective argu-
ments simply fall flat. We have become deeply skeptical of any intuitive or naive
use of measure concepts precisely because we know the pitfalls. Because of our
mathematical experience, we know how complicated and badly-behaved functions
and sets of reals can be in their measure-theoretic properties. We know that any
naive account of measure will have a fundamental problem dealing with subsets of
the plane all of whose vertical sections are countable and all of whose horizontal
sections are co-countable, for example, precisely because the sets looks very small
from one direction and very large from another direction, while we expect that
rotating a set should not change its size.
Consider the variation of Freiling’s argument based directly on that intuition:
intuitively, all sets are measurable, and also rotating sets in the plane preserves
measure; but if the CH were to hold, then there is a subset of the unit square,
such as the graph of a well-ordering of the unit interval in order type ω1, with all
horizontal sections countable and all vertical sections co-countable; this set appears
to have measure zero from one direction and measure one from another. Hence,
CH fails.
The opponents to Freiling’s argument will answer this modified argument by
pointing out that our detailed experience with non-measurable sets prevents us from
accepting the naive claim that every set is measurable. Similarly, for the original
Freiling argument, we are simply not convinced by Freiling’s argument that the
axiom of symmetry is intuitively true, even if he is using the same intuitions that
guided us to the basic principles of measure theory. An experienced mathematician
answers Freiling’s intuitive appeal by pointing out that it relies fundamentally on
having nice measure-theoretic properties for the set { (x, y) | y ∈ f(x) }, whereas we
have extensive experience with very badly behaved sets and functions, and no reason
to suppose this set is not also badly behaved in that way. In an extreme instance
of this, inverting Freiling’s argument, set theorists sometimes reject the axiom of
symmetry as a fundamental axiom, precisely because of the counterexamples to it
that one can produce under CH. In short, because we are deeply familiar with a way
that the axiom of symmetry can fail, we do not accept the intuitive justifications
as establishing it as true.
Ultimately, rather than being accepted as the longed-for solution to the contin-
uum hypothesis, Freiling’s argument is instead most often described as providing
an attractive equivalent formulation of ¬CH, a curious and interesting form of it.
The typical presentation of the axiom of symmetry includes a discussion of Freil-
ing’s dart-throwing justification, but in my experience this discussion is usually
given not as evidence that the axiom is true, but rather as a warning about the
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measure-theoretic monsters, a warning that we must take extra care with issues of
non-measurability, lest we be fooled. In this way, Freiling’s simple philosophical
argument is turned on its head, used not as a justification of the axiom, but rather
as a warning about the error that may arise from a naive treatment of measure con-
cepts, a warning that what seems obviously true might still be wrong. The entire
episode bears out the pattern of response I predict for any attempted use of the
dream solution template, namely, a rejection of the new axiom from a perspective
of deep mathematical experience with the contrary.
Let me turn now to a second illustration of this pattern of response. Consider the
set-theoretic principle that I have called the powerset size axiom PSA, the axiom
asserting plainly that smaller sets have fewer subsets:
∀x, y |x| < |y| =⇒ |P (x)| < |P (y)|.
Set theorists understand the situation of this axiom very well, which I shall shortly
explain. But how is it received in mathematics generally? Extremely well! A large
number of mathematicians, including some very good ones, although invariably
from non-logic-related areas of mathematics, look favorably upon the axiom when
it is first considered, viewing it as highly natural or even obviously true. They
take the axiom to express what seems be a basic intuitive principle, namely, that a
strictly smaller set should have strictly fewer subsets. The principle, for example,
is currently the top-rated answer [Hamb] among dozens to a popular mathoverflow
question seeking examples of reasonable-sounding statements that are neverthe-
less independent of the axioms of set theory, and the same issue has arisen in at
least three other mathoverflow questions, posted by mathematicians asking naively
whether the PSA is true, or how to prove it or indeed asking with credulity how
it could not be provable. My experience is that a brief conversation with math-
ematicians at your favorite math tea stands a good chance to turn up additional
examples of mathematicians who find the axiom to express a basic fact about sets.
Meanwhile, set theorists almost never agree with this assessment. They know
that the axiom is independent of ZFC, for one can achieve all kinds of crazy patterns
for the continuum function κ 7→ 2κ via Easton’s theorem. Even Cohen’s original
model of ¬CH had 2ω = 2ω1 , the assertion known as Luzin’s hypothesis [Luz35],
which had been proposed as an alternative to the continuum hypothesis. Further-
more, Martin’s axiom implies 2ω = 2κ for all κ < 2ω, which can mean additional
violations of PSA when CH fails badly. So not only do set-theorists know that PSA
can fail, but also they know that PSA must fail in models of the axioms, such as
the proper forcing axiom PFA or Martin’s maximum MM, that are often favored
particularly by set-theorists. For some set theorists, the simple philosophical sup-
port of PSA is suppressed as naive in favor of a complex philosophical interest in
the forcing axioms, which imply ¬PSA.
So the situation with the powerset size axiom is that a set-theoretic principle
(1) that many mathematicians find to be obviously true, (2) which surely expresses
an intuitively clear pre-reflective principle about the concept of size, and (3) which
furthermore is known by set-theorists to be perfectly safe in the sense that it is
relatively consistent with the other axioms of ZFC and in fact a consequence of
the generalized continuum hypothesis, is nevertheless almost universally rejected
by set-theorists when it is proposed as a fundamental axiom.
Although the PSA does not settle the CH, my point here is that nevertheless
this rejection of the powerset size axiom follows the predicted pattern of response
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to the dream solution template: a clear and succinct mathematical principle, pro-
posed as fundamental, enjoys a strong intuitive appeal and obvious nature, but is
nevertheless rejected from a perspective of deep experience with the contrary. We
simply know too much about the various ways that the principle can be violated
and have too much experience working in models of set theory where the principle
fails to accept it as a fundamental truth.
Let me propose a thought experiment of my own. Imagine that the history
of set theory had proceeded differently, that the powerset size axiom had been
considered at the very beginning of set theory, perhaps used in a proof settling a
major open question of the period. For example, consider the question whether the
symmetric groups Sκ and Sλ on distinct infinite cardinals, the respective groups of
all permutations on fixed sets of size κ and λ, are non-isomorphic as groups. The
PSA implies an immediate affirmative answer, since the groups have size 2κ and 2λ,
respectively, and under the PSA these are distinct.1 Because of the natural appeal of
the axiom, it seems plausible to imagine that the PSA might have found its way onto
the standard list of axioms: perhaps an alternative Zermelo might have formalized
the symmetric group argument and presented ZFC+PSA as the list of fundamental
axioms, just as our actual Zermelo formalized his proof of the well-order principle
with ZC. In this imaginary alternative history, we might now look upon models
of ¬PSA as strange in some fundamental way, regarding them to violate a basic
intuitive principle of sets concerning the relative sizes of power sets; perhaps our
reaction to these models would be like the current reaction some mathematicians
(not all) have to models of ZF+¬AC or to models of Aczel’s anti-foundation axiom
AFA, namely, the view that the models may be interesting mathematically and
useful for a purpose, but ultimately they violate a basic principle of sets. The point
I want to make with this thought experiment is that without our current detailed
technical knowledge of how PSA can fail, we would likely have found the intuitive
appeal more compelling. Indeed, the ease with which set theorists today shrug off
the enormous intuitive pull of PSA is surprising.
I have argued, then, that there will be no dream solution of the continuum hy-
pothesis. Let me now go somewhat beyond this claim and issue a challenge to those
who propose to solve the continuum problem by some other means. My challenge
to anyone who proposes to give a particular, definite answer to CH is that they
must not only argue for their preferred answer, mustering whatever philosophical
or intuitive support for their answer as they can, but also they must explain away
the illusion of our experience with the contrary hypothesis. Only by doing so will
they overcome the response I have described, rejection of the argument from ex-
tensive experience of the contrary. Before we will be able to accept CH as true, we
must come to know that our experience of the ¬CH worlds was somehow flawed;
we must come to see our experience in those lands as illusory. It is insufficient to
present a beautiful landscape, a shining city on a hill, for we are widely traveled
and know that it is not the only one.
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